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VIRGINIA JORDAN, Appellant, V. ANDREW B. T AI~BOT, 
Respondent. 
[1] Appeal- Decisions Appealable - Judgment Notwithstanding 
Verdict.-Ail order granting judgment notwith~tanding the 
verdict, which is but a step preliminary to final judgment, 
is not appealable. 
[2] Id.-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New Trial.-Whcre 
an order granting a lIew trial does not specify in~uffi('ien('y 
of evidence to support the verdict, thnt ground cannot be con-
sidered on appeal unless the evidence is without conflict and 
in;;ufficient as a matter of law. 
[3] Forcible Entry and Detainer-Statutory Provisions.-In defin-
ing forcible entry, Code Civ. Proc., § 1159, refers to "every 
person," thereby including owners as well as strangers to the 
title. 
[4] Id.-Defenses-Right of Reentry.-Under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1172, relating to the showing required of defendant in an 
action for forcible entry and detainer, a right of reentry is not 
a defense to such action. 
[5] Id.-Defenses-Ownership or Right of Possession.-Both be-
fore and after enactment of the present forcible entry and 
detainer statutes, ownership or right of possession to the 
property was not a ddense to an action for forcible entry. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, §§ 582, 583. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 48.1; [2] Appeal 
and Error, § 1209a; [3] Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 5; [4, 5] 
Forcible Entry and Detniner, § 28; [6, 16] Forcible Entry and 
Detainer, § 2; [i] Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 3; [8] Landlord 
and Tenant, § 228; [9, 10] Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 1; 
[11] Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 23; [12] Forcible Entry and 
Detainer, §§ 16, 17; [13] Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 17; [14] 
Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 16; [15] FOl'cihle Entry and Dc-
tainer, ~ 15; [17J Forcible Entry nnd Detainer, § 21; [18] Forcihle 
Entry and Detainer, § 25; [1f)] Landlord and Tenant, § 264; [20] 
Landlord and Tenant, § 2-*0; [21] Larlfl\ol'll lind Tenant, § 155(2); 
(22] Innkeepers, ~ 6; [23] Forcible }<jntry :Iud Detainer, §§ 23,56; 
p·I] Tl'Ovpr, ~7; [2:i] Tre~pH~s, §§4, 27; [26,27] Damnges, §30. 
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[6] Id.-Nature and Purpose of Action.-An action of foreihle 
entry and detainer is a sUllllllary proceeding to recover posses-
sion of property forcibly or unlawfully detained. The inquiry 
is confined to the actual peaceable possession of plaintiff and 
the unlawful or forcible ouster or detention by defendant, 
the object of the Inw being to prevent disturbance of the 
public pea('e by the forcible assertion of a. private right. 
[7] Id.-Questions of Title or Right of Possession.-Questions of 
title or right of possession cannot arise in an action of forcible 
entry and detainer. A forcible entry on the actual possession 
of plaintiff being proven, he would be. entitled to restitution 
though the fee-simple title and present right of possession are 
shown to be in defendant. 
[8] Landlord and Tenant-Notice to Quit-Necessity.-Under 
Code Civ. PI·OC., § 1161, a lessor lUay sumlllarily obtain posses-
sion of his real property within three dnys. This remedy is 
a complete answer to IIny claim that self-help is necessary. 
[9a, 9b] Forcible Entry and Detainer-Unlawfulness of Forcible 
Entry.-A provision in a lease expressly permitting a forciblc 
entry would be void as contrary to the public policy set forth 
in Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1159, defining forcible entry. 
[10] Id.-Unlawfulness of Forcible Entry.-Regardless of who 
has the right to possession of property, orderly procedure and 
preservation of the peace require that actual possession shall 
not be disturbed except by legal process. 
{11] Id.-Acts Constituting-Unlawful Entry.-Defendant lessor 
violated Code Civ. Proc., § 1159, subd. 1, prohibiting entry by 
means of breaking open doors or windows, when he unlocked 
plaintiff's apartment without her consent and entered with 
employees of a storage company to remove her furniture for 
nonpayment of rent, though there was no physical damage 
to the premises or actual violence. 
[12a, 12b] Id.-Force and Violence-What Constitutes: Particular 
Acts.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 1159, subd. 2, a forcible entry 
is completed if, after a peaceable entry, the occupant is 
excluded from possession by force or threats of violence, as 
where defendant lessor, after· unlocking plaintiff's apartment 
during her temporary absence and removing her furniture 
without her consent for nonpayment of rent, rendered the 
apartment unsuitable for residence and forced her to seek 
shelter elsewhere. (Disapproving holding in Baxley v. Westem 
Loan rJ: Bldg. Co., 135 ClIl.App. 426, 429 [27 P.2d 387] that 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1159, subd. 2, . applies only to cases of 
"scl'UlIlbling po~St'ssi()n;' Illlll ""I'I'I'uling Patter v. 1Ilerl'l'r, 53 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Forcihle l<;ntry and Detlliner, § 3; Am.Jur., 
Forcible Entry and Detainer, § 6. 
) 
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Cal. 667, 67·1, holding' Ihal "llI'h ~llhdi\"i;;ion is not applicnble 
wh('n owner of laud pt'llhihil,; 1'I'('utI'Y by occupant.) 
[13] ld.-Force and Violence-Particular Acts.-Where plaintiff 
on returning to her apartment, which had been entered by 
defendant lessor during her temporary absence, inquired about 
her belonging~, which were removed without her consent for 
nonpayment of rent, and defendant's employce ordered her· 
to "Get the hell out of here. You're out of this place," the 
jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was justified in 
believing that any attempt on her part to reinstall her furni-
ture would be met by force. 
[14] leL - Force and Violence - What Constitutes. - There is a 
forcible entry under Code Civ. Proc., § 1159, subd. 2, if a 
show of force is made that causes the occupant to refrain 
from reentering. 
[15] ld.-Force and Violence-Necessity.-To constitute a forci-
ble entry and detainer, it is not necessary that violence and 
outrage on the persons and property should in fact be resorted 
to. If the actual possession of another in a house or tene-
ment be taken and held under circumstances which show that 
it will not be surrendered without a breach of peace on one 
side or the other, this constitutes forcible entry and detainer. 
[16] ld.-Purpose of Statute.-Code Civ. Proe., § 1159, defining 
forcible entry and detainer, was intended to prevent. bloodshed, 
violence and breaches of the peace likely to result from wrong-
ful entl'ies into the possession of others, and it would be 
absurd to say that, to enable a party to avail himself of its 
provisions, there must have occurred precisely the evil which 
it was the object of the law to prevent. 
[17] leL-Force and Violence-Forcible Detainer.-Under Code 
.Civ. Proc., § 1160, subd. 1, providing that a person is guilty 
of forcible detainer if he "[b]y force or by menaces and 
threats of violence unlawfully holds and keeps the possession 
of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably 
or otherwise," force and menace can be implied from defend-
ant lessor's agent's removal of plaintiff's furniture from her 
apartment and his admonishment to "Get the hell out of here. 
You're out." 
[18] ld.-Entry and Detainer.-A person who obtains possession 
to property by a forcible entry does not have the right to 
retain possession. 
[19] Landlord and Tenant-Remedies of Landlord-Reentry.-No 
immediate right to possession of property can be obtained 
under a right of reentry until a proper three-day notice has 
been served on the lessee or grantee. (Civ. Code, § 791.) 
[20] ld. - Notice to Quit - Service.-Civ. Code, § 791, providing 
that a lessor having a right of reentry may reenter after 
) 
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the right has accrued 011 three dnys' notice as provided in 
Code Civ. Proe., ~§ 1161, 1162, was not eomplicd with by thl' 
lessor's mere act of posting the three-dny notice under. thl' 
lessee's door, there being no evidence that the lessee was pcr- i 
sonally served or that a copy of such notice was mailed to 
her home. 
[21] Id.-Rent-Security-Oontracts for Lien-Enforcement.-
Where a lease IH·ovision granting the lessor a lien for rent due 
does not spccify a means of enforcement, equitable action 
would be necessury to make the lien operative. 
[22] Innkeepers-Liens.-The statuto!-'Y lien granted lessors b~· 
Civ. Code, § 1861a, relating to lilins of keepers of apartment 
houses, must be enforced in a lawful manner and without 
violation of the forcible entry statute. 
[23] Forcible Entry and Detainer-Evidence: Unlawful Entry.-A 
verdict of forcible entry and detainer was supported by evi-
dence that defendant lessor entered plaintiff's apartment 
without her consent, such entry violating Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1159, and by evidence that defendant refused to allow 
plaintiff to recnter her apartment, such conduct violating Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1160. Since the policy of these code sections is 
preservation of the peace, the rights thereunder may not be 
contracted away; thus defendant's right of reentry and his 
lien on personal property in the apartment for nonpayment of 
rent did not justify his entry into the apartment. 
[24] Trover-What Oonstitutes Oonversion.-A lessor who re-
moved the furniture and personal effects from a tenant's apart-
ment for nonpayment of rent and stored it in a warehouse 
in the owner's name without any other exercise of dominion 
or control was not guilty of conversion. 
[25] Trespass-To Personal Property.-Where there is no sub-
stantial interference with possession or the right to personal 
property, but only an intermeddling with or use of or damag-
ing of such property, the owner has a cause of action for 
trespass or case and may recover only the actual damages 
suffered by reason of impairment of the property or loss of 
its use. 
[26] Damages-Mitigation of Loss-Duty of Injured Party.-In 
an action for alleged conversion of an apartment tenant's 
personal property which defendant removed from the apart-
ment for nonpayment of rent and stored in a warehouse in 
plaintiff's name, plaintiff had a duty to minimize damages 
where she knew that. the property was being held in storage 
in her name and where, if she had funds or could obtain them 
[24] See Oal.Jur.2d, Trover and Conversion, § 13 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Trover and Conversion, § 24 et seq. 
) 
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by a lien on the property held, she was under a duty to 
reco\'er her goods as soou as possible nnd was entitled only 
to costs of storage for whate\'er time was reasonable to make 
new arrangements. If she ('.ould show that she was without 
funds or means of obtaining them to pay the storage costs, 
she would be under no duty to recover the furniture to mini-
mize damages. 
[27] Id.-Mitigation of Loss-Duty' of Injured Party.-The duty 
to minimize dnmnges does not require an injured person to 
do what is unreasonnble or impracticable and, when expendi-
tures are necessary for minimization of damages, the duty 
does not run to a person who is financially unable to make 
such expenditures. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the City 
and County of San Francisco granting a new trial and grant-
ing judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Edward Molken-
buhr, Judge. Order granting lle,,, trial affirmed; appeal from 
other order, dismissed. 
Action for forcible entry and detainer and for conversion 
of personal property. Order granting defendant a new trial, 
affirmed. 
Daniel Kass for Appellant. 
Hartly Fleischmann for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J. - Plaintiff was a tenant in defendant's 
apartment house. The lease provided that the lessor had a 
right of reentry upon the breach of any condition in the lease 
and a lien upon all personal effects. furniture, and baggage 
in the tenant's apartment to secure the rents and other 
charges. One of the conditions ,vas the payment of $132.50 
rent on the first of each month. Plaintiff paid the rent for 
eight months. After she was two months in arrears in rent, 
defendant, without her consent and <luring her temporary 
absence, unlocked the door of her apartment, entered and 
removed her furniture to a warehouse, and refused to allow 
her to reoceupy the apartment. Thereupon plaintiff filed this 
action for forcible entry and detainer1 and for conversion of 
her furniture and other personal property. 
'Seetion 1159 of the Colle of Civil Procellure defines a forcible entry 
as follows: "E,-ery person is guilty of A. forcible en~ry who either: 
"I; By' breakinK open doors, windows, or other parts of a house. or 
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The jury rcturned a verdict of $6,500 for forcible (,l1try 
and detainer and for conversion and $3,000 punitive damag('s. 
Plaintiff appcals from an order granting defendant's motion 
for a new trial. [ 1] She also purports to appeal from an 
order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, whieh 
is but a step prcliminary to final judgmcnt and not an ap-
pealable order. (Schramko v. Saulter, 146 Cal.App.2d 549, 
!153 [3.03 P.2d 1061].) The appeal from that order will there-
fore bc dismissed. The record docs not show that the final 
judgment has been entered. 
The order granting the new trial specifies' that it is based 
Slolely on the ground of error occurring at the trial. [2] "In 
thc absence of the specification of insufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict, we are precluded from considering 
the question whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the verdict unless it was without couilict and insufficient as 
a matter of law." (Adams v. American President Lines, 23 
Ca1.2d 681, 683 [146 P.2d 1].) 
Defendant contends that there is no evidence that he vio-
lated either section 1159 or 1160 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and that the evidence is therefore insufficient as a 
matter 'of law to sustain a verdict for forcible entry ann 
detainer. He bases this contention on the grounds that (1) his 
entry was not unlawful, since he had a right of reentry; (2) he 
did not violate subdivision 1 of section 1159, since he did 
110t use force to enter the premises; (3) he did not violate 
subdivision 2 of section 1159, since that subdivision applies 
only when a stranger to the title obtains a "scrambling" 
possession (a possession concurrent with that of the person 
having a right to possession); (4) he did not violate subdivi-
sion 1 of section 1160, since he neither unlawfully nor forcibly 
hy any kind of violence or circulllstances of terror enters upon or into 
:lIlY real property; or 
"~. Who, after enteriug peaceably upon any real property, turns out 
),y force, threats, or menacing conduct, the party in possession." 
I'('ction 1160 of the Code of Civil Proced ure defines a forcible de-
tailler as follows: "Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who 
either: 
"1. By force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully 
hol,ls and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same 
wns aC'1uire<l peaceably or otherwise; or 
"~. Who, ill the night-time. or during the absence of the occupant 
of allY bu,Is, unlawfully cllters upou renl propcrty, and who, after 
.1clI1nn,1 llla,Ie for tlte snrrell<l('r t"er('of, for the period of five days, 
refuses to surrellder the same to sueh former occupant. 
"The occupant of real property. within the meaning of this sub-
.lh·ision. is one who, witi,in th'c days preceding such unlawful cntry, 
was in the peaceable and untiisturoed possession of such lands." 
) 
) 
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detaiucd POSSl'SSiOIl to the apat'lnlt'nt; anll tliat (5) in allY 
ease his entry \vas privileged by virtue of his lien on the 
pt'operty ill thc apartment. 
Defelldant's Right of Reentt·y is 110t a Defense 
to an Action for Fm'ciblc Entt·y 
[3] In defining forcible entry section 1159 of the Code 
of Civil l>roccdure refers to "every person," thereby in-
cluding owners as well as strangers to the title. [4] Under 
section 1172 of the Code of Civil Procedure the plaintiff 
"shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible 
entry or forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceabl~' 
in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or 
was entitled to the posse!;sion at the time of the forcible 
detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or 
his ancestors, or those whose interest in sUl'h premises he 
claims, have been in thc quiet possession thereof for the 
space of one w1101c yeal' to!,l'l,ther next before the commence-
ment of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is not 
ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the pro-
ceedings." Nowhere is it stated that a right of reentry is 
a defense to an action for forcible entry or detainer. 
Nor can such a defense be implied from the historical back-
ground or purpose of the statute.2 
[Ii] Both before and after the enactment of the present 
forcible entry and detainer statutes this court held that 
ownership or right of possession to the property was not a 
defense to an action for forcible entry.s In McCauley v. 
Weller (1859), 12 Cal. 500, 524 [decided before the enact-
ment of sections 1159-1179<\ of the Code of Civil Procedure] 
and in Voll v. Hollis (1882), 60 Cal. 569, 573 [decided after 
the enactment of the foregoing sections] it was held that 
evidence of defendant's ownership of the land was irrelevant 
to the question of liability for a forcible entry and detainer. 
'The original forcible entry and detainer statute, enacted in England in 
1381 (5 Richard II ch. 7; see Dickinson, v. Maguire, !J Cal. 4r" "O-.i1), 
provided only criminal sanctions for its hreach. The pm-pose of the stnt-
ute was to preserve the peace by preventing disturhanecs thnt frC'lUclltl~' 
accompanied struggles for the possession of land. (!'lee 2 Tuylor, Lnnd· 
lord and Tenant 412 [9th ed.]; Dickinson v. Maguire, supra.) This early 
prohibition against self·help extended to persons having a right to posse.,-
sion and thus fostered recourse to orderly court process. (See 1 I1arp<'r 
and James, The Law of Torts, 200.) 
"Even' though evidence of title is irrele\-unt to the issue of liability, it is 
admissible to determine damagcA. (Karp v. Maruoli.t, 1;;9 Cnl.App.2d 00, 
74·75 [323 P.2d 557].) 
) 
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[6] " [T J he aetioll of fOl'('iblc entry and del ainer is a 
SUIlIJl1at·y pl'oeeeding to rceover possession of premises for,·ihl.\· 
or unlawfully detained. The illfjuiry in such cases is confined 
to the aetual peaceable possession of the plaintiff and tile 
uulawful or forcible ouster or detention by defendant-til,' 
object of the law being to prevent the disturbance of the 
public peace, by the forcible assertion of a private right. 
[7] Questions of title or right of possession can not arise; 
a forcible entry upon the actual possession of plaintiff being 
proven, he would be entitled to restitutio.n, though the fee-
simple title and present right of possession are shown to be 
in the defendant. The authorities on this point are numerous 
and uniform." (Voll v. Honis, supra, 60 Cal. 569, 573; 
accord: Giddings v. '76 Land &- Water Co. (1890), 83 Cal. 
96, 100-101 [23 P. 196] ; Mitchell v. Davis (1863), 23 Cal. 
381, 384, 385; Davis v. Mitchell (1865), 1 Cal.Unrep. 206, 
207-208; Lasscrot v. Gamble (1896),5 Cal.Unrep. 510, 515; 
[(err v. O'Keefe (1903), 138 Cal. 415, 421 [71 P. 447] ; Cali-
fornia Products, Inc. v. Mitchell (1921), 52 Ca1.App. 312, 
314 [198 P. 646 J ; Eichhorn v. De La Can tera (1953), 117 
Cal.App.2d 50, 54-55 [255 P.2d 70] ; Martill v. Cassidy (1957), 
149 Cal.App.2d 106, 110 [307 P.2d 981) .)4 
In Lasserot v. Gamble, supra, Kerr v. O'Keefe, supra, Cali-
fornia Products, Inc. v. Mitchell, supra, and Martin v. Cas-
sidy, supra, the landlord entered pursuant to a lease grant-
ing him a right of reentry similar to defendant's right of 
reentry in the present case. In each case the court held that 
absent a voluntary surrender of the premises by the tenant, 
the landlord could enforce his right of reentry only by judi-
,·ittl process, not by self-help. [8] Under seetion 1161 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure a lessor may summarily obtain 
possession of his real property within three days. This remedy 
is a complete answer to any claim that self-help is necessary. 
As in the foregoing cases, the lease herein is silt-nt as to the 
method of enforcing the right of reentry. [9a] In any event 
a provision in the lease expressly permitting a forcible entry 
'Prior to 1872 several California cases held, contrary to McCauley v. 
TV eller, supra, that good faith or ownership of the property was a defense 
to an action for forcihle entry or detainer. (See To'wnsena v. Little, 4;; 
Cal. 673, 6iu; Powell v. Lane, 4ii Cal. 677, 678; Shelby v. HOW/ton, 3S 
Cal. 410. 4:!2; Thompson v. Smith, :!8 Cal. 527, 532.) In Vall v. Hol/i.', 
supra, 60 Cal. 569, 575, it was held that Shelby v. Houston and Tho·mpson 
v. Smith" have no application undeT the provisions of the Code of Civil 
Procedure [1872)." To·u;n..end v. Little and Powell v. Lane expressly 
relied on Shelby v. Houston and likewise have no application under those 
provisioDs. 
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would be void as contrary to the public poliq set forth in 
section 1159. (Spencer v. Commercial Co., 30 Wash. 520 
[71 P. 53, 55] [involving forcible entry and detainer statutes 
identical with section 1159 J ; cf. Ca.lifor1ll:a Products, Inc. v. 
~Wch('ll, sup-ra, 52 Cal.App. 312, 314-315.) [10] Regard-
less of who has the right to possession, orderly procedure 
and prcservation of the peacc require that the actual possession 
shall not be disturbed except by legal process. 
Defendant 1I:as Guilty of Forcible Entry 
[11] Section 1159, subdivision 1, prohibits an entry by 
means of breaking open doors or windows. Defendant violated 
this section when he unlocked plaintiff's apartment without 
her consent and entered with the storage ('ompany employees 
to remove her furniture, even though there was no physical 
damage to the premises or actual violence. 
It is true that before 1872 several cases held that actual 
force or violence was a necessary element in an action for 
forcible entry. (Frazier v. Hanlon, 5 Cal. 156, 157-158; Dick-
inson v. Maguire, 9 Cal. 46, 51; McMinn v. Bliss, 31 Cal. 122, 
126-127; Buel v. Frazier, 38 Cal. 693, 696.) These cases, how-
ever, were decided under a statute different from section 
1159. (See Cal. Stats., 1866, ch. DL, p. 768.) It is also true 
that some cases subsequent to the adoption of section 1159 have 
stated that only an entry accompanied by force or violence 
constitutes a violation of section 1159, subdivision 1. In most 
of these cases, however, the statements were unnecessary to 
the decision. In certain cases relief was given either because 
there was a use of force (Ely v. Yore, 71 Cal. 130, 133 [11 P. 
868J [nine persons entered in absence of tenant and removed 
a fence] ; Knowles v. Crocker Estate Co., 149 Cal. 278, 283 
[86 P. 715J [defendant and his agents entered in absence of 
occupant and removed a fence]) or because there was a 
forcible detainer (see Giddings v. '76 Land & Water Co., 83 
Cal. 96, 100 [23 P. 196]). Tn oth(>)" rases whrre relief was 
denied, the plaintiff did not have possession of the property 
(Goldstein v. Webster, 7 Cal.App. 705, 707-709 [95 P. 677]), 
or consented to the entry (Providence Baptist Assn. v. Los 
Angeles etc. Temple, 79 Cal.App.2d 734, 738 [180 P.2d 925]). 
Rarely was relief denied on the ground that the entry was 
not accompanied by force. (See Edwards v. Bodkin, 43 Cal. 
App. 405, 406 [18;:; P. 423] ; compare Bruley v. Western Loan 
& Bldg. Co .. 1::J" Cal.App. 426, 411 r27 P.211 3871; Moldovan 
v. Fischer, 149 Cal.App.2d 600, 608 [308 P.2d 844] [where 
) 
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thc cntries were appar('utly with the conscnt of the possessors' 
manager or employees].) 
}fany other df.'cisions of this {'ourt and the District Courts 
of Appeal have implied forec ill an cntry matle upon land 
in thc poss('ssion of another without his cOllsent, despite thl' 
ahsellt'c of' eithl'r violenec or plJysicaT damage. (Balik of Cali-
fornia Y. Taaffe, 76 Cal. 626, 630 [18 P. 781] (entry through 
window in oecupant's absence, rClJloval of occupant's furni-
ture and refusal to allow reentr~'J ; lVkite v. Pfieffer, 165 Cal. 
740, 742 [134 P. 321J [('ntry h;\- {rnndulellt pretensesJ; 
lVl:nchcsfer v. Becker, 4 CaJ.App. 382;384 [88 P. 2!J(jJ [('ntry 
by unlocking door in tellant's absellee J ; Californ ia Products, 
Il1C. v. 1Ilifcllcll, 52 CaJ.App. 312, 313 [198 P. 646] (removal 
of a lock in tenant's ahs('IIl'(' J ; Pacific States .Littxil. Corp. v. 
Farris, 118 C'aI.App. 522, 52-1 f5 P.2tl 452] [t'lltry during 
occupant's absent'e and without his eOlls('ntJ ; McNeil v. Hig-
gins, 86 CaJ.App.2d 723, 725 (I!):; 1'.211 470J [entry through 
open window in occupant's ah';('lIc<'] ; Karp v. Margolis, ]59 
Cal.App.2d 69, 73 [323 P.2d 557 J [IlSC of loel,smith to open 
door during occupant's abs('uce J.) 
In Winchester v. Becker, supra, 4 Cal.App. 382, 384, defend" 
ant also used a key to unlock the t('uant's door in the absence 
of the tenant. The <:ourt held that any unauthorized opening 
of a closed door is a breaking open of the door ,vi thin the 
meaning of this subdivision. The words "brealdng open" 
in section 1159 were given the meaning they had in the com-
mon law of burglary. Likewise ill lIcNeil v. Higgins, supta. 
86 Cal.App.2d 723, 725, the court held that an entry through 
all open window was an entry , 'gained by the exercise of 
unlawful force" and in violation of s('ction 1159. 
In Karp v. Margolis, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d 69, 73, the 
owner of a retail store <'lItercd the property with the help of 
a locksmith in the abscnce of the o(·cupant. The court held 
that the entry was peaceable hut that the defendant was 
nevertheless guilty of foreible entr~', stating, "[ dJ efendants 
also say there can be no forcible entry here because they got 
possession in the absence of plaintiffs and so there was no 
violence or circumstances of trrror. Forcible entry is not 
t"onfined to cases where a fight takes plac(', or physical force or 
restraint is used, or there are threats of physical hal'm. . . . 
No flat br(,:leh of the peace is nec('ssary [t·itation], the statute 
heing enact('d to obviate su(,h ineidpllts of self help as occurrN) 
)]('re. " 
In Illinois, under a statute similar to 5 Richard II chapter 
) 
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7, forr!' has h{'{'n defin('d as an ('llt r.\· ngaillr.t the ('onsent or 
the oc('upant. The court thrre statrd that an entry hy for('e 
means "no more than the term 'vi et aI'mis' means at common 
law; that is, 'with either actual or implied force.''' (Phelps 
v. Randolph. 147 Ill. 335 [35 N.E. 243,245]; s('e also Prosser 
on Torts 100 [2d ed.]; 1 Harper and James, The La,v of 
Torts 262; 2 Taylor, Landlord an(l Tenants 414, f. n. 1 
[9th ed.].) 
[128,] Even if ,ve were to interpret the 11rst suhdivision 
of section 1159 as being inapplicable unless a door or window 
was physically damaged or threats of violence actually 
occurred, the evidence in the instant case would nevertheless 
support a finding of forcible entry as defined by subdivision 2 
.of section 1159. Under that subdivision a forcible entry is 
completed if, after a peaceable entry, the occupant is excluded 
from possession by force or threats of violence. The remonl 
of plaintiff's furniture without her consent rendered the 
apartment unsuitable for residence and forced ller to seek 
shelter elsewhere. [13] Moreovcr, when plainti1f returned 
to her apartment at 1 :30 a. m. and inquired about her belong-
ings defendant's employee ordered her to "Get the hell out 
of here. You're out of this place. DOll't talk to me about it. 
Call Mr. Talbot." The jury could reasonably conclude that 
plaintiff was justified ill believing that any attempt on her 
part to reinstall her furlliture would be met by force. 
[14] It has long beell settled that there is a forcible entry 
under subdivision 2 if a show of force is made that causes 
the occupant to refrain from reentering (McCauley v. Weller, 
12 Cal. 500, 527; Treat v. Forsyth, 40 Cal. 484, 488; Kerr v. 
O'Keefe, 138 Cal. 415, 421-422 [71 P. 447].) [15] "'To 
constitute forcible entry and detainer, it is not necessary that 
violence and outrage upon the [person] and property should 
in fact be resorted to. If the actual possession of another in 
a house or tenement be taken and held under circumstances 
which show that it will not be surrendered without a breach of 
peace on the one side or the other, this constitutes a case of 
forcible entry and detainer.' [Citations.] 
[16] "The statute was intended to prevent bloodshed, 
violence and breaches of the peace, too likely to result from 
wrongful entries into the possessiollof others; and it would 
be absurd to say, that to enable a party to avail himself of 
its provisions, there must have occurred precisely the evil 
which it was the object of the law to prevent." (McCauley 
v. Weller, 8/tpra, 12 Cal. 500, 527.) [12b] " Although 
) 
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the entry was praeahly ma<1r, thr subsequent exe1l1sioll of 
plaintiff by force and thrrats constituted a forrihle entry 
under the statute." (Kerr v. 0 'Keefe, supra, 138 Cal. 415, 
421.) 
In Baxley v. Western Loan &; Bldg. Co., supra, 135 Cal. 
App. 426, 429, on which defendant relies, the court held that 
subdivision 2 of section 1159 applies only to cases of .. scram-
bling possession." No authority was cited for this proposition. 
It conflicts with the express holdings of this court in 
McCauley v. Weller, supra, Treat '-. Forsyth, supra, 'and Ket'r 
v. O'Keefe, supra, and is therefore disapproved. Potter v. 
Jlcrcer, 53 Cal. 667, 674, which held that subdivision 2 of 
section 1159 is not applicable wllen the owner of the land 
IJrohibits rcentry by the occupant, likewise conflicts with the 
foregoing cases and is overruled. 
Defendant was GuUty of a Forcible Detainer 
[ 17] Subdivision 1 of section 1160 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides that a person is guilty of a forcible 
detainer if he "[b)y force or by menaces and threats of 
violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession of any 
real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or 
otherwise." (Italics added.) In the present case there is 
evidence that the apartment was withheld by force and menace 
and that such withholding was unlawful. 
Force and menace can be implied from defendant's agent's 
removal of plaintiff's furniture and his admonishment to 
"Get the hell out of here. You're out. . . ." 
[18] The detention was unlawful, for a person who 
obtains possession to property by a forcible entry does not 
have the right to retain possession. (Lasserot v. Gamble, 
5 Cal.Unrep. 510, 515.) Moreover, defendant did not prop-
erly serve a three-day notice as required by section 791 of 
the Civil Code. [ 19 ] It is settled that no immediate right 
to possession can be obtained under a right of reentry until 
a proper three-day notice has been served on the lessee or 
grantee. (Civ. Code, § 791; Igauye v. Howard, 114 Cal. 
App.2d 122, 125-126 [249 P.2d 558]; Lydon v. Beach, 89 
Cal.App. 69, 74 [264 P. 511].) 
[20] Section 791 provides that a lessor having a right 
to reentry may reenter after the right has accrued upon three 
days' notice as provided in sections 1161 and 1162 of Code 
of Civil Procedure. Defendant testified that he posted a 
three-day notice under plaintiff's door. There is no evidence 
that plaintiff was personally served or that a copy of the 
) 
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three·day notice was mailed to her home. The mere act of 
posting the notice under the door does not comply with sec· 
tion 1162. 
Defendant was not Au.tltorized to Enforce his 
Lien by Entedng Plaintiff's IIome 
[21] The provision in the lease granting defendant a 
lien does not specify a means of enforcement. In Ohilds etc. 
00. v. Shelburne Realty 00., 23 Ca1.2d 263, 268 [143 P.2d 
697], where the lessor had a similar lien, we stated "in the 
absence of provisions in the lease for enforcement, equitable 
action would be necessary to make the lien operative. [Cita. 
tions.]" (Ohilds etc. 00. v. Shelburne Realty 00., 23 Cal.2d 
263,268 [143 P.2d 697].) [9b] Even if the lease had au-
thorized a forcible entry it would be invalid as violating 
the policy of the forcible entry and detainer statutes. (See 
Oalifornia Products, Inc. v. Mitchell, 52 Cal.App. 312, 315 
[198 P. 646] ; Spencer v. Oommercial 00., 30 Wash. 520 [71 
P. 53, 55].) 
Williams v. Gelleral Elec. Oredit 00., 159 Cal.App.2d 527 
[323 P.2d 1046], on ,vhich defendant relies, was an action 
for trespass after the repossession of a chattel under a con· 
ditional sales contract. The forcible entry and detainer statutes 
were not considered. 
[22] Nor is defendant's position aided by the statutory 
lien granted to lessors by Civil Code, section 186la. That 
statute provides an exemption for most of the property seized 
by defendant. Moreover, that lien must also be enforced in 
a lawful manner and without violation of the forcible entry 
statute. 
In Van Dorn v. Oottch, 21 Cal.App.2d Supp. 749, 754-755 
[64 P.2d 1197], relied on by defendants, the court permitted 
a landlord to enter into a .furnished apartment without the 
consent of the occupant to enforce a lien under section 1861a. 
That case, however, was decided before the present amendment 
to section 1861a. The statute in effect at that time dealt 
with liens in favor of keepers of furnished apartments, not 
with lessors renting an apartment under a lease. Moreover, 
that statute did not contain the exemption provided for in 
the present statute. Although both the statutory lien and 
the lien provided for in the lease gave defendant valuable 
rights, these rights had to be lawfully enforced. 
[23] We conclude therefore that the evidence supports 
the verdict of forcible entry and detainer. There was en· 
56 c..Jd-al 
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dence that defenrlant entered plaintiff's apartment without 
her consent. Such an entry violates section 1159 of thc Code 
of Civil Procedure. There was evidence that uefrndant re-
fused to allow plaintiff to reenter her apartment. Such con-
uuct violates section 1160 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
SinC'e the policy of these sections is the preservation of the 
peace, the rights thereunder may not be contracted away; 
thus defendant's right of reentry and his lien on personal 
propcrty in the apartment did not justify his entry into the 
apartment. 
Defendant did not Convert Plailztiff's Goods 
[24] Defendant stored most of thc items removed from 
plaintiff's apartment in a warehouse in plaintiff's name. The 
itrms that the warehousemen had difficulty removing were 
stored in the lessor's basement and lleld for the plaintiff. The 
lessor did not use any of plaintiff's belongings or make any 
claim of ownership to them. In Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Ca1.2d 
541,551 [176 P.2d 1], we held that the removal of another's 
property and storing it in the owner's name without any 
other exercise of dominion or control is not a conversion. 
[25] We there stated that "[w]here the conduct com-
plained of does not amount .to a substantial interference with 
the possession or the right thereto, but consists of inter-
meddling with or use of or damages to the personal property, 
the owner has a cause of action for trespass or ease, and may 
recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the 
impairment of the property or the loss of its use." (Zaslow 
v. Kroenert, supra, at p. 551; see Prosser on Torts [2d ed], 
pp. 102-107; Fleming on Torts, p. 58.) 
Plaintiff is therefore entitled only to actual damages in 
an amount sufficient to compensate her for any impairment 
of the property or loss of its use. (Zaslow v. Kroeneri, supra, 
549-552.) 
[26] Furthermore, plaintiff had a duty to minimize 
damages. (Valenc1<L v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal.2d 840, 844 [147 
P.2d 558].) She knew that the property was being held in 
storage in her name. If she had the funds, or could obtain 
them by a lien on the property held, she was under a duty 
to recover her goods as soon as possible and is entitled only 
to costs of storage for whatever time is reasonable to make 
new arrangements. Plaintiff would have had to move to new 
quarters under any circumstances since she wa,'" in arrears 
in her rent and defendant had the right to reenter pursuant 
to legal process, There was testimony that additional loans 
') 
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could have been obtained on the furniture. On rctrial, how-
ever, plaintiff may show that she was without funds or means 
of obtaining them to pay the storage costs. In that ease 
she would not be under a duty to recover the furniture to 
minimize damages. [27] "The duty to minimize damages 
does not require an injured person to do what is unreasonable 
or impraetieable, and, consequently, wIlen expenditures are 
necessary for minimization of damages, the duty does not run 
to a person who is financially unable to make such expendi-
tures." (Va.lclIcia v. Shell Oil Co., supra, 23 Ca1.2d 840, 846.) 
The verdict for conversion was as a matter of law un-
supported by tile evidence. The new trial was therefore prop-
erly granted. 
The purported appeal from the order granting judgment 
notwithstanding the venHct is <lismisscd. The order granting 
a ne\v trial is affirmed. Each side is to bear its own costs on 
appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and Dooling, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It appears to me that upon 
a review of the entire record the evidence on the points at 
issue here should be held to be, as a matter of law, insufficient 
to support a judgment for the plaintiil' and that affirmance 
of the order granting defendant's motion for a new trial 
should be placed upon that ground. 
Plaintiff in her opening brief states that "Briefly, the 
facts are, that the Appellant [plaintiff] was a tenant in the 
apartment house of Respondent [defendant]. Respondent 
served a three day notice on Appellant. Then, one day during 
the absence of the Appellant, Respondent called Lyon Van 
and Storage and removed all of Appellant's furniture, rugs, 
clothing, and personal belongings from said apartment. Re-
spondent did not at any time file all unlawful detainer action 
to obtain possession." 
The record, vie\ved favorably to plaintiff, shows also that 
on May 14, 1958, plaintiff by her own admission was two 
months in arrears in rent and had previou!';l;v given dl·fandallt 
a rent check for one of such months ,vhich had not been 
honored by her hank. Her possession was uuder a written 
lease which provided, among other things, that" In the event 
of any violation of said terms and condition!'; by the tenants 
the lessor shall have the right to take possession forthwith 
.) 
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and terminate this tenancy rt'turning to tenants any unU!~ed 
portion of rent paid, after deducting necessary closing 
charges .... 
"Lessor shall have a lien upon all personal effects, furni-
ture and lJi\ggage contained in tenants' apartment for all 
unpaid charges." 
On May 10, 1958, defendant serwd upon plaintiff a three-
day notice to quit. Then on Ma~' H, 1958, in plaintiffs' 
absence defp]Hlant's manager pntered the prpmises by means 
of a l{('y (undisputably without any brl'adl .. of the peace) and 
had plaintiff's furniture and other possessions removed by 
a storage eompallY and stored for plaintiff's account. When 
plaintiff returned to the apartment and entered it some time 
after 1 :30 a.m. 011 Ma;\' 13, 1958, she discovered the absence 
of her furnishings and made inquiry of the manager. He 
said to her, "Get the hell out of hel·e. You're out of this 
place. Don't talk to me about it. Call :\fr. Talbot [defendant]." 
Later the same day she telephoned to defendant's attorney 
who told her her furniture was at the storage company if she 
wanted to pick it up. Still later in the day she filed this 
action for forcible entry and detainer and for conversion. 
The jury returned a verdict ill plaintiff's favor in the 
sum of $6,500 as gt'ueral damages plus $3,000 pun"itive dam-
ages; defendant's motion for new trial was granted as noted 
hereinabove, and this appeal by plaintiff followed. 
I believe that the above-quoted terms of the lease gave 
defendant a contractual right to enter the apartment and 
to remove the furnishings, and provide a complete defense 
to this action. 
In Baxley v; Western Loan & Bldg. Co. (1933), 135 Cal. 
App. 426 [27 P.2d 387J. as in the case at bench, plaintiff 
rharged forcible entry and detainer under the provisions of 
seetiollS 1159 anu ] 160 of the Code of Civil Procedure.1 
'Section 1159: "Every person is guilty of a forcihle entry who either: 
"1. By breaking ·open doors, windows, or other parts of a house, or by 
nny kind of violence or circumstances of terror enters upon or into any 
real property; or 
":!. 'Vho, nfter entering peaceably upon any real property, turns out 
hy force, threats, or menacing condu,·t, the party in posRession." 
Section 1160: "Every person is guilty of a forcihle detainer who 
either: 
"1. By force, or by menaces and thr~:Its of violenee, unlawfully hol,ta 
and keeps the possession of any real property, whetl\(~r the same was ac· 
quired peaCl~ahly or otherwise; or 
":!. Who, in till! night·time. or during the auscllce of the occupant of 
any lands, unlawfully enters upon real property, and who, after demand 
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'l'her(', defendant was vrn<lor unt1rr an illstallment cont l"aet 
of sale of an apartment hO\ls(' whil"h gave 1 he V('lldre thr right 
of possession "until a bl·eal'll or a dl'fault by the vendee" 
and gave the vendor the right upon any breach or default 
to "reenter upon the premises and resume possession thereof." 
After the vendee fell in arrears on several paynwlIts de-
fendant's employe informed the manager of the apartment 
that he was going to take possession and remain on the prem-
ises for defendant. The manager admitted him, installed 
him in one of the apartments, and agreed to continue as man-
ager for defendant. The next day plaintiff appeared nt the 
building and demanded that defendant's representative leave 
the premises, which was refused. Duringthe discussion which 
followed either force or threats of foree were used by both 
parties. Plaintiff then left the premises. It was held (p. 429 
[2}) that no foreible entry was shown under subdivision 1 
of section 1159 because the aetnal entry by defendant was 
not accompanied "by an~' kind of violence or circumstances 
of terror," that subdivision 2 was intended to cover situntions 
where one who had gained peaeable access thereafter evicted 
the occupant by force or the like, and that no such rircum-
stance had occurred. 'Vith respect to forcible detainer under 
the provisions of section 1160, thc court, citing various eases, 
recognized the rule to be that (p. 430 [3]) "When contraetual 
relations 'exist betwet'n the parties whereby the right to pos-
session has been given to the one taking possession by means 
of the peaceable entry, then neither the entry nor detention 
of the property is 'unlawful' within the meaning of said sec-
tion 1160 dealing with forcible detaine1·," and held that neither 
defendant's entry upon nor its detention of the premises was 
"unlawful" under the provisions of section 1160. 
More specifically, as to the contractual riglJts of the owner, 
Mr. Justice Spence spoke for a unanimous court as follows: 
"Upon default in the payments, respondent was entitled to 
possession under the contract between the parties and could 
take possession if it could be done peaceably. (Francis v. 
West Virginia Oil Co., 174 Cal. 168, 170 [162 P. 394]; 25 
CaLJur., p. 696, at 697.) We are of the opinion that when 
respondent, acting under its right conferred upon it by the 
made for the surrender thereof, for the period of five daYR, r('fuses to sur 
render the same to such fonner occupant. 
"The occupant of real property, within the meaning of this subdivision, 
is one who, within five days preceding such unlawful entry, was in the 
peaceable and undisturbed posseMsion of such lanels." (Italics added.) 
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('(lntract between t.he parties, obtain('d pOSSl'ssioll or Ih(' 11I'(,1Il-
i~H\S hy m('nns of a pear.('ahl(' (\ntry. nrithrr th(' entry upon 1101' 
Iltcdrtrntion of the premisrs WM 'unlawful' within the mrau-
ing of the subdh·ision·" of said sretion 1160 r\'lating to foreiM,. 
detainer." (P. 431 of 135 Cn1.App.) 
And ill Moldovan v. FiRchel' (1957), 149 Ca1.App.2d 600 
[308 P.2d 844], in which defendants had made a nonforeiblE' 
rntry during the absence of the occupant, the rule was again 
declared, in reliance upon Ba:rley v. lV estern Loan &- Bldg, 
Co. (1933), supra, 135 Cal.App. 426, 430, tbat (pp. 608-609 
[9, 10]) "where there is no foree involved' in the entry, and 
where the entry is pursuant to a contract between the parties, 
the entry is la\vful," 110 unlawful entry or detainer has oc-
curred and any "subsequent force and threats of force did 
not make the entry forcible." As further emphasized in 
lIoldovan (p.609 [101), the "principles upon which the. , . 
r above rule] is hased have been recognized in other cases 
[citations], and apparently are in accord with the general 
Tule ill other jurisdictiolls. (See annotations, 45 A.L.R. 313; 
49 A.Jol.R. 517; 60 A.hR. 280.)" (Italics added.) I quote 
fl'om 45 A.L.R. 321: "According to the weight of authority, 
a provision in a lease giving to the landlord the right on 
certain contingencies, to re-enter without process or by such 
force as is necessary, is valid." The note cites supporting 
casE'S from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, 
Oregon, and England. In 49 A.L.R. 511-517, a Mississippi 
('ase is cited, in which appears the declaration that "Where 
the landlord is entitled to possession which is unlawfully 
withheld by his tenant, and the lease cOlltraet provides, as 
it does in effect in the present ease, that the landlord may 
re-enter without legal proceedings, such a contract is binding 
to the extent that the landlord may re-enter, provided he 
does so without breaking doors, windows, or other passages 
of ingress, and neither uses nor threatens personalviolenee 
to\\'aro the tpl1ant .... " (Clark v. Service Auto Co. (1926), 
143 Miss. 603 [108 So. 704, 707 [2], 49 A.L.R 511].) 
Plailltiff, however, relies upon California Products, Illc. 
v. llIitchell (1921), 52 Cal.App. 312 [198 P. 646], in whit'll 
defendants, lessors of premises on which plaintiff was five 
months in arrears in the payment of rE'ut, removed a loek 
from the door and entered during plaintiff's absence. The 
lease provided that at any time the rent was unpaid it should 
be lawful for the lessors "without previous notice or demand, 
t.o re-enter the demised premises and the same peaceably to 
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hold and enjoy thenceforth as if this lease had not been 
made." The court, in sermingly mistaken reliance upon W in-
chester v. Becker (1906), 4 Ca1.App. 382 [88 P. 296), held 
that defcndants' entry had been forcible, and was conse-
quently not protected by the quoted lease proyision. In the 
latter case (Winchester v. Becker, supra) defendant had first 
entered plaintiff's house by means of a key which was secreted 
over the back door. Plaintiff thereafter recovered this key 
and ordered defendant's agent off the premises. Defendant 
thcn, claiming "under a pretended agreement for a sale of 
the lamd on which a deposit of $100 had been paid" (italics 
added) but which contained no autllOrity .for defendant to 
enter, again entered the premises through the front door by 
means of a "false key." The finding was that defendant 
entered "fraudulently and without right" and the reviewing 
court held that the second entry was forcible within the pro-
visions of subdivision 1 of section 1159 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure ("breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of 
a house"). 
I believe the better view, and one more in keeping with the 
general weight of authority in other jurisdictions, is that 
stated and followed in the first cited cases (Baxley v. Western 
Loan & Bldg. Co. (1933), supra, 135 Cal.App. 426, and 
Moldovan v. Fischer (1957), supra, 149 Cal.App.~d 600), and 
that where, as here, entry is authorized by contract and is 
made by means of a key only, which is, after all, the same 
means as used by the tenant to enter, and where no actual 
force, violence, menace, threats or "circumstauces of terror" 
are shown (cf. Providence Baptist Assn. v. Los Angeles etc. 
Temple (1947),79 Cal.App.2d 734,738 [1] [180 P.2d 925]), 
no forcible entry has been established. Further since defend-
ant here, as in Baxley and Moldovan, had a contractual right 
to possession of the premises, his detention of them following 
peaceable entry ,"as lawful and did not constitute forcible 
detainer. The holding of the majority, "that the evidence 
supports the verdict of forcible entry and detainer. There 
was evidence that defendant entered plaintiff's apartment 
without her consent," appears to me, on the whole record, 
to merit no more persuasive effect than that which the drawee 
bank accorded plaintiff's rent check-the check with which 
plaintiff, durillg the pel'ioll relevant to this lawsuit, pur-
portedly "paid" for the right to use and occupy that por-
tion of defendant's premises which the majority refer to as 
"plaintiff's apartment." 
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It should be recognized that it is still presumably lawful 
for adult persons, not convicted of felony, to own real prop-
('t·t.v, contract for its rental, require the tenant to pay the 
agreed valuc of occupancy, and provide for security therefor, 
inclndillg a right of peaceful reentry upon any default of 
thc tenant. Tenants and property owners may agree that 
the latter shall have some rights as against defaulting tenants, 
short of the time and expense required by court proceedings, 
lind where such rights can be exercised peaceably, as was 
done here, it seems to me only common al!d elementary justice 
that the courts uphold them. It may be further observed that 
thc import and effcct of the majority holding in refusing to 
sustain those rights appears to constitute state action impair-
ing the obligation of a contract in violation of section 10 
(clause 1) of article I of the Constitution of the United States 
and section 16 of article I of the Constitution of California. 
Finally, and most distressing in my view, is (he seeming 
alignment of the court on the side of the person who not only 
breached a contract but, according to the undisputed evi-
dence, appears to have compounded the civil wrong by issuing 
and passing a check without sufficient funds or credit, to the 
end of extending her unlawful taking of the owner's property 
(the use and occupation of his premises) for a further period 
without compensation. To reward such a person for such 
conduct at the expense of the innocent party to the contract 
(whose only wrong consisted in believing that a contract, 
admittedly executed by competent parties with a lawful object 
and for a valuable consideration, would be upheld) appears 
to mc to pervcrt law and subvert justice. 
In the circumstances I would hold that as a mattcr of law 
plaintiff is not entitled to judgment against dcfendant for 
forcible entry and detainer. 
McComb, J., and White, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 10, 
1961. Sehauer, J., McComb, J., and 'White, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
